

Jim Co

ACTION 34998-X

State Dept. review completed pages 2-6

MORI C05098431

SECRET

November 23, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR:

DR. KISSINGER

FROM:

NSS/NSC, State Dept. reviews completed

HAROLD H. SAUNDERS

SUBJECT:

Message for Ambassador Farland

Ambassador Farland has sent you the two messages at Tab B supplementing his reporting through State Department channels with a personal assessment to you.

It would probably be a good idea at this point at least to send him a brief acknowledgment so as to keep this channel open. The first two paragraphs of the message at Tab A to be sent back channelare drafted for this minimal purpose.

There is a third paragraph in the message as I have drafted it, which could be dropped. The point here is that Farland in his last message indicated that President Yahya seems fixed on his political timetable and is not inclined to be side-tracked by getting Mujib into the act. If this is the case and if we were to have a little more time, we would be in the business of trying to argue with Mrs. Gandhi to let Yahya's timetable play itself out. It seems to me worthwhile to ask Farland what the maximum argument is that we can use with the Indians in making this case if we choose to. However, if you do not like this idea the telegram could be sent with paragraph 3 just dropped.

RECOMMENDATION: That you authorize sending the back channel message at Tab A to Ambassador Farland.

Approved	
Send it without paragraph 3	

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TO: Amembassy ISLAMABAD

FOR: AMBASSADOR FARLAND EYES ONLY

FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER

- 1. Appreciate your personal assessments of the situation and note particularly your sense that Yahya is showing signs of pressure and beginning to feel cornered. I have been following your reporting closely and recognize your sense of urgency.
- 2. Want you to know that I am chairing daily meetings of the WSAG and the President is personally engaged. Would certainly welcome any suggestions on steps you feel might be useful.
- 3. If the current fighting escalates, hope of movement on Yahya's political plan of action could be overtaken. If it still has a chance, however, our problem is how to persuade the Indians to give it a chance. They may--I might even say probably--have already decided not to give it a chance. But we may have opportunity to make one final argument with Mrs. Gandhi. We certainly do not want to compromise Yahya's process or make him appear to be weakening before Indian pressure. But if there is anything that could be said privately to the Indians here on what the Bengalis can expect to get out of this political process, it would be helpful to have. Again, I emphasize that I am not

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suggesting pressure on Yahya or concessions by him. We are simply groping for ways to present the case for his process in a way that might have maximum cogency for Indians. The argument we would be trying to make is that if Mrs. Gandhi just keeps the lid on the East Pakistanis can have a political framework within which to develop autonomy without the costs of a prolonged war.

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HHSaunders:tmt 11/23/71

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